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Abstract—In this paper, we study the problem of secret key
generation from both correlated sources and a secure channel.
We obtain the optimal secret key rate in this problem and show
that the optimal scheme is to conduct secret key generation and
key distribution jointly, where every bit in the secret channel
will yield more than one bit of secret key rate. This joint scheme
is better than the separation-based scheme, where the secure
channel is used for key distribution, and as a result, every bit in
the secure channel can only provide one bit of secret key rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of secret key generation was introduced by
Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1] and Maurer [2], where two separate
terminals, named Alice and Bob, observe the outcomes of a
pair of correlated sources separately and want to generate a
common secret key, which is concealed from an eavesdropper
Eve, given that the terminals can communicate through a
noiseless public channel which the eavesdropper has complete
access to. In [1], the secret key capacity of correlated sources
was characterized when Alice and Bob are allowed to com-
municate once over a channel with unlimited capacity. The
secrecy key capacity when there is a constraint on the rate of
the public channel was found by Csisza´r and Narayan [3] as
a special case of their result when there is another terminal
called the ”helper” that is not interested in recovering the key
but rather helping generating the secret key. In [4]–[6], the
authors considered the case where Alice communicate over a
noisy broadcast channel rather than a noiseless public channel,
i.e., the wiretap channel.
In some applications, in addition to the public channel
between Alice and Bob, there may exist a secure link between
Alice and Bob as well. One example is in wireless sensor
network, where the nodes wants to share a secret key to
encrypt their communication. In this application, the frequency
selectivity of the fading channel will create both public and
secure channels between Alice and Bob. More specifically, in
some frequency bands, the links from Alice to both Bob and
Eve are of good qualities, which constitute the public channel,
while in some other frequency bands, the link from Alice to
Bob is of good quality, but the link from Alice to Eve is
basically broken. These frequency bands can be viewed as a
secure channel. Another example comes from [7], where Alice
and Bob are nodes equipped with multiple antennas and they
communicate with the help of multiple single-antenna relays
employing the amplify-and-forward strategy. We assume that
Fig. 1. Key Generation with Additional Secure Channel
some relays are ”nice but curious” [8], while the other relays
are simply nice. Therefore, the links through the curious relays
are public, while the links through the nice relays are secure.
Motivated by the above applications, in this paper, we
consider the problem of secret key generation where Alice,
in addition to the public channel, has a secure channel to
communicate with Bob. We explore the optimal strategy when
the correlated sources, the public channel and the secure link
between Alice and Bob, are all available. Under this scenario,
one nature scheme is a separation-based scheme, where the
public channel is used for key generation and the secure
channel is used for key distribution. In this scheme, every bit
in the secure channel can add one bit of secret key rate. In this
paper, we obtain the secret key capacity and show that in the
optimal scheme, the secure channel is used to conduct both the
secret key generation and the key distribution jointly. In this
joint scheme, every bit in the secure channel can yield more
than one bit of the secret key rate, and therefore, it outperforms
the separation-based scheme.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND MAIN RESULT
Consider a network with three nodes, including a trans-
mitter Alice, a receiver Bob and an eavesdropper Eve. We
assume three discrete memoryless sources indicated by ran-
dom variables (X,Y, Z), defined in the alphabets (X ,Y,Z),
respectively. We assume that Alice and Bob observe the n-
length source sequences Xn and Y n, respectively, and Eve
observes n-length source sequence Zn. A key generation code
consists of two encoding functions f1 and f2 and two decoding
functions g1 and g2, defined as follows:
f1 :X
n 7→ {1, 2, . . . , L1} (1)
f2 :X
n 7→ {1, 2, . . . , L2} (2)
g1 :X
n 7→ {1, 2, . . . , J} (3)
g2 :Y
n × {1, 2, . . . , L1} × {1, 2, . . . , L2} 7→ {1, 2, . . . , J}
(4)
Here, M1 = f1(X
n) is sent through the public channel and
M2 = f2(X
n) is sent through the secure channel. Then
the secret key K is generated by Alice and Bob from the
functions g1 and g2, respectively, which should agree with
probability 1 and be concealed from Eve. The probability
of error for the key generation code is defined as P
(n)
e =
Pr{g1(Xn) 6= g2(Y n,M1,M2)}. A secret key rate RK with
constraint communication rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable if
for any ǫ > 0 there exists a key generation code such that
P (n)e ≤ ǫ (5)
1
n
I(K;Zn,M1) ≤ ǫ (6)
1
n
log J ≥ RK − ǫ (7)
1
n
logL1 ≤ R1 + ǫ (8)
1
n
logL2 ≤ R2 + ǫ (9)
The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For given sources (Xn, Y n, Zn), the rate triple
(RK , R1, R2) is achievable if and only if
RK ≤ I(U ;Y |T )− I(U ;Z|T ) +R2 (10)
R1 +R2 ≥ I(U ;X |Y ) (11)
R1 ≥ I(T ;X |Y ) (12)
where random variables (U, T,X, Y, Z) satisfy the following
Markov chain
T → U → X → (Y, Z) (13)
III. THE CONVERSE
We begin the proof of the converse with
nRK ≤ H(K)
≤ H(K)−H(K|Y n,M1,M2) + nǫ (14)
= I(K;Y n,M1,M2) + nǫ
≤ I(K;Y n,M1,M2)− I(K;Z
n,M1) + 2nǫ (15)
= I(K;Y n,M1) + I(K;M2|Y
n,M1)
− I(K,M2;Z
n,M1)− I(M2;Z
n,M1|K) + 2nǫ
= I(K,M2;Y
n,M1) + I(K;M2|Y
n,M1)− I(M2;Y
n,M1|K)
− I(K,M2;Z
n,M1)− I(M2;Z
n,M1|K) + 2nǫ
= I(K,M2;Y
n,M1) + I(K;M2|Y
n,M1)− I(M2;Y
n,M1,K)
− I(K,M2;Z
n,M1)− I(M2;Z
n,M1,K) + 2nǫ
= I(K,M2;Y
n,M1)− I(M2;Y
n,M1)
− I(K,M2;Z
n,M1)− I(M2;Z
n,M1,K) + 2nǫ (16)
= I(K,M2;Y
n|M1)− I(K,M2;Z
n|M1)
− I(M2;Y
n,M1)− I(M2;Z
n,M1,K) + 2nǫ
= I(K,M2;Y
n|M1)− I(K,M2;Z
n|M1) +H(M2)
− I(M2;Y
n,M1)−H(M2|Z
n,M1,K) + 2nǫ
≤ I(K,M2;Y
n|M1)− I(K,M2;Z
n|M1) + nR2 + 2nǫ
(17)
where (14) follows from Fano’s inequality; (15) follows from
the secrecy constraint in (6).
By applying the key identity [9, Lemma 17.12], it follows
that
I(K,M2;Y
n|M1)− I(K,M2;Z
n|M1)
=n[I(U ;YJ |T )− I(U ;ZJ |T )] (18)
where
T , (M1, Y
i−1, Zn
i+1, J) (19)
U , (K,M2, T ) (20)
Here, J is uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , n} and indepen-
dent of (Xn, Y n, Zn). Since K , M1 and M2 is a function
of Xn, the Markov Chain T → U → X → Y Z is satisfied.
Because of the fact that (Xn, Y n, Zn) are i.i.d., we can replace
YJ and ZJ by Y and Z . Then (10) is proved.
Then we consider the sum rate (R1 +R2)
n(R1 +R2)
≥ H(M1,M2)
≥ H(M1,M2|Y
n)
≥ H(K,M1,M2|Y
n)− nǫ (21)
≥ H(K,M1,M2|Y
n)−H(K,M1,M2|X
n)− nǫ
= I(K,M1,M2;X
n)− I(K,M1,M2;Y
n)− nǫ
=
n∑
i=1
[I(K,M1,M2;Xi|X
n
i+1, Y
i−1)
− I(K,M1,M2;Yi|X
n
i+1, Y
i−1)]− nǫ (22)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(K,M1,M2, X
n
i+1, Y
i−1;Xi)
− I(K,M1,M2, X
n
i+1, Y
i−1;Yi)]− nǫ (23)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(K,M1,M2, X
n
i+1, Y
i−1, Zni+1;Xi)
− I(K,M1,M2, X
n
i+1, Y
i−1, Zn
i+1;Yi)]− nǫ (24)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(K,M1,M2, X
n
i+1, Y
i−1, Zn
i+1;Xi|Yi)− nǫ (25)
≥
n∑
i=1
[I(K,M1,M2, Y
i−1, Zni+1;Xi)
− I(K,M1,M2, Y
i−1, Zni+1;Yi)]− nǫ (26)
where (21) follows from Fano’s inequality; (22) follows
from the key identity [9, Lemma 17.12]; (23) follows
because (Xn, Y n, Zn) are i.i.d., (24) follows from the
Markov Chain Zn
i+1 → (K,M1,M2, X
n
i+1, Y
i−1) →
(Xi, Yi); (25) follows from the Markov Chain Yi →
Xi → (K,M1,M2, X
n
i+1, Y
i−1, Zn
i+1); (26) follows from the
Markov Chain Xn
i+1 → (K,M1,M2, Y
i−1, Zn
i+1, Xi) → Yi.
Then we have
n(R1 +R2) ≥ n[I(U ;XJ)− I(U ;YJ)]
= nI(U ;XJ |YJ)
= nI(U ;X |Y )
with U as defined in (20) and J is uniform on {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Finally, for the public rate R1, we have
nR1 ≥ H(M1)
≥ H(M1|Y
n)
≥ H(M1|Y
n)−H(M1|X
n)
= I(M1;X
n)− I(M1;Y
n)
By the similar argument as in the sum rate derivation, we have
nR1 ≥
n∑
i=1
[I(M1Y
i−1Zni+1;Xi)− I(M1Y
i−1Zni+1;Yi)]
≥ n[I(T ;XJ)− I(T ;YJ)]
= nI(T ;XJ |YJ )
= nI(T ;X |Y ) (27)
where T as defined in (19) and J is uniform on {1, 2, . . . , n},
which concludes the proof of the converse.
IV. THE ACHIEVABILITY
The achievability scheme that we propose in this paper
can be viewed as a combination of the scheme in secret
key generation from correlated sources [3], consisting of
a codebook of the superposition structure, and secret key
distribution through secret channel. The rate of the public
channel and the secure channel are used for the transmission
of the following:
1) the inner code T n.
2) the outer code Un.
3) key distribution.
Our proposed scheme follows the principles below:
• The public channel is used to transmit the inner code T n.
Since the rate of the inner code is less than the rate of
the public channel, then the leftover rate of the public
channel will be used to transmit the outer code Un.
• The secure channel is used to transmit the outer code
Un. Since there is still extra rate leftover in the secure
channel, then the leftover rate of the secure channel can
be used for key distribution.
• The public channel can not be used for key distribution
and the secure channel can not be used to transmit the
inner code T n.
We show that the proposed scheme achieves the rate in
Theorem 1 and is thus, optimal. The details of the proof can
be found in the appendix.
V. DISCUSSIONS
We first elaborate on the principles of the proposed scheme
in the previous section. Since distributing key through public
channel will compromise the confidentiality of the key, the
public channel can not be used for key distribution. Regarding
the principle where the secure channel does not transmit the
inner code, from the proof of the achievability in the appendix,
we will find that the conditional distribution PT |X for the inner
code satisfies
I(T ;Y ) ≤ I(T ;Z) (28)
which means, Eve can obtain extra knowledge about T n from
Zn than what Bob gets from Y n. This extra knowledge means
that though part of T n is transmitted through the secure
channel, it is not secure because Eve can infer this secure
part of T n from her observation of Zn.
Regarding the principle that for the rate of the secure
channel, the transmission of the outer code gets higher priority
than key distribution, we explain by comparing our proposed
scheme with the separation-based scheme, where the public
channel is used for key generation and the secure channel is
used for key distribution. The secret key rate of the separation-
based scheme is
RK ≤ I(U ;Y |T )− I(U ;Z|T ) +R2 (29)
R1 ≥ I(U ;X |Y ) (30)
where random variables (U, T,X, Y, Z) satisfy the following
Markov chain
T → U → X → (Y, Z) (31)
Comparing the above secret key rate to the secret key rate in
Theorem 1, we find that the expressions for the secret key
rate RK are the same for both schemes, but the constraints
on the public and secure rates are stricter for this separation-
based scheme, which results in a smaller value of the term
I(U ;Y |T ) − I(U ;Z|T ), and therefore a smaller secret key
rate in this separation based scheme. The reason is that in
the separation-based scheme, the secure channel is only used
for key distribution. Therefore, every bit of the secure channel
rate gives one bit of secret key rate. However, for the proposed
joint scheme, which is optimal, the secure channel is used to
transmit the outer code. Every bit through the secure channel
for the outer code remains secure to the eavesdropper, and
therefore yields one bit of secret key rate. In addition, one
bit of the outer code through the secure channel helps in the
scheme of key generation by delivering one more bit to Bob,
which gives a larger secret key rate. We conclude that every bit
that we increase on R2 can contribute in two different aspects
in the joint scheme and yield more than one bit of the increase
in secret key. Hence, the proposed joint scheme outperforms
the separation based scheme. This explains why, for the rate
of the secure channel, the transmission of the outer code gets
higher priority than key distribution.
Based on the discussion of the above paragraph, we con-
clude that when fixing R1, every bit increased in R2 will
provide more than one bit of secrecy key rate. Next, consider
the case where the sum rate R1 + R2 is fixed. We note that
increasing R2 will improve the optimal RK because we can
always use the secure channel as the public channel, which will
keep RK the same. Then the optimal scheme will outperform
this simple scheme and yield a larger secret key rate. If we
look into the expressions in Theorem 1, we can find that
increasing R2 (and therefore decreasing R1), on one hand,
will increase the last term R2 in the expression of RK in
(10), but on the other hand, will decrease the first two terms
I(U ;Y |T )−I(U ;Z|T ) of RK in (10) by tighten the constraint
on the distribution in (12). Therefore, we conclude that every
bit that we move from R1 to R2 will provide no more than
one bit of increase on the optimal secret key rate RK .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of key generation from
both correlated sources and a secure channel. We found the
secret key capacity when there are rate constraints on both
channels, by providing the proofs of both achievability and
the converse. We showed that the optimal scheme is to use the
secure channel for secret key generation and key distribution
jointly, in which case every bit in the secure channel can yield
more than one bit of secret key. This optimal scheme is better
than the separation-based scheme where the public channel is
used for secret key generation and the secure channel is used
for key distribution, in which one bit in secure channel can
only give one bit of secret key.
APPENDIX
Consider a given distribution
p(tuxyz) = p(ut)p(x|u)p(yz|x) (32)
Case 1: If R1 ≥ I(U : X |Y )
We use a separate scheme as follows. Alice use the public
channel to achieve a secrecy rate I(U ;Y |T )− I(U ;Z|T ) by
the scheme in secret key generation, and use the secure channel
to distribute another secret key with rate R2. Combine two
secret keys together, the secrecy rate in (10) is achievable.
Case 2: If R1 ≤ I(U : X |Y ).
In this case, we assume that I(T ;Y ) ≤ I(T ;Z). The reason
is that if I(T ;Y ) > I(T ;Z), we define a pair of new random
variable (U ′, T ′) such that U ′ = (U, T ) and T ′ = ∅. Then we
have I(T ′;Y ) ≤ I(T ′;Z). From the three inequalities in the
main theorem, we have
RK ≤ I(U ;Y |T )− I(U ;Z|T ) +R2
≤ I(U ′;Y |T ′)− I(U ′;Z|T ′) +R2 (33)
R1 +R2 ≥ I(U ;X |Y ) = I(U
′;X |Y ) (34)
R1 ≥ I(T ;X |Y ) ≥ I(T
′;X |Y ) (35)
The above derivation shows that for every pair (U, T ) with
Markov chain T ′ → U ′ → X and I(T ;Y ) > I(T ;Z), we
can find another pair (U ′, T ′) with Markov chain T → U →
X and I(T ′;Y ) ≤ I(T ′;Z) such that the rate region with
(U ′, T ′) is achievable implies that the rate region with (U, T )
is also achievable. Therefore, we only need to consider the
case where I(T ;Y ) ≤ I(T ;Z).
We define the following notations
R11 = I(T : X |Y ) (36)
R12 = R1 −R11 (37)
R21 = I(U ;X |Y, T )−R12 (38)
R22 = R2 −R21 (39)
RT = I(T ;X) (40)
RU = I(U ;X |T ) (41)
RK1 = I(U ;Y |T )− I(U ;Z|T ) (42)
Codebook generation:
1) Randomly and independently generation 2nRT sequences
tn(s1), s1 ∈ [1 : 2nRT ] according to distribution p(t) and
randomly and independently partition them into 2nR11
bins with bin indices B1(m11), m11 ∈ [1 : 2
nR11 ].
2) For each codeword tn(s1), randomly and independently
generation 2nRU sequences un(s1, s2), s2 ∈ [1 : 2nRU ]
according to p(u|t), and randomly and independently
partition them into 2n(R12+R21) bins with bin indices
B2(s1,m12,m21), m12 ∈ [1 : 2nR12 ] and m21 ∈
[1 : 2nR21 ]. Randomly and independently partition the
sequences in each nonempty bin B2(s1,m12,m21) into
2nRK1 bins with bin indices B2(s1,m12,m21, k1), k1 ∈
[1 : 2nRK1 ].
Encoding:
1) Given a source sequence Xn, find the index s1 such
that (tn(s1), X
n) is jointly typical with respect to the
joint distribution p(t, x), i.e., (tn(s1), X
n) ∈ T n[TX]δ .
If there is no such index or there are more than one
such indices, then randomly select s1 from [1 : 2
nRT ],
where the probability of such event is arbitrarily small if
RT > I(T ;X). Let B1(m11) be the bin index of t
n(s1).
2) Then find the index s2 such that
(tn(s1), u
n(s1, s2), X
n) ∈ T n[TUX]δ . If there is no
such index or there are more than one such indices, then
random select s2 from [1 : 2
nRU ], where the probability
of such event is arbitrarily small if RU > I(U ;X |T ).
Let B2(s1,m12,m21, k1) be the bin index of u
n(s1, s2).
3) Randomly choose k2 ∈ [1; 2
nR22 ].
4) Alice sends M1 = (m11,m12) and M2 = (m21, k2) to
Bob through the public and secure channel, respectively.
5) Alice chooses K = (k1, k2,m21) as the secret key.
Decoding: Upon receiving (M1,M2), Bob decodes the
secret key as following:
1) Find the unique sequence tn(sˆ1) ∈ B1(m11) such that
(tn(sˆ1), y
n) ∈ T n[TY ]δ . And the probability that there is no
such sequence or there are more than one such sequences
is arbitrarily small if
RT −R11 < I(T ;Y ) (43)
2) Find the index sˆ2 ∈ B2(sˆ1,m12,m21) such
that (tn(sˆ1), u
n(sˆ1, sˆ2), y
n) ∈ T n[TUY ]δ . Let
B2(sˆ1,m12,m21, kˆ1) be the bin index of u
n(sˆ1, sˆ2).
The probability that there is no such sequence or there
are more than one such sequences is arbitrarily small if
RU −R12 −R21 < I(U ;Y |T ) (44)
3) Let Kˆ = (kˆ1, k2,m21)
Key leakage rate: We consider the key leakage rate averaged
over the random coding scheme C as described above. We
begin with
H(K|Zn,M1)
= H(K,Un, T n|Zn,M1)−H(U
n, T n|Zn,K,M1)
= H(Un, T n|Zn,M1) +H(K|U
n, T n, Zn,M1)
−H(Un, T n|Zn,K,M1)
= H(T n|Zn,M1) +H(U
n|Zn,M1, T
n) +H(K2)
−H(T n|K,Zn,M1)−H(U
n|K,Zn,M1, T
n) (45)
= I(T n;K|Zn,M1) +H(U
n|Zn, T n) +H(K2)
− I(Un;M1|Z
n, T n)−H(Un|K,Zn,M1, T
n)
≥ H(Un|Zn, T n) +H(K2) +H(M1|Z
n, T n, Un)
−H(M1|Z
n)−H(Un|K,Zn,M1, T
n)
≥ H(Un|Zn, T n) +H(K2)−H(M1)
−H(Un|K,Zn,M1, T
n) (46)
≥ H(Un|Zn, T n) + nR22 − nR1
−H(Un|K1,M21, Z
n,M1, T
n) (47)
where (45) follows because K = (K1,K2,M21), in which
K2 is independent of (U
n, T n, Zn,M1) and K1 and M21 are
functions of Un; (46) follows because M1 = (M11,M12)
is a function of (T n, Un); (47) follows because K2 is uni-
formly distributed, H(M1) is upper bounded by nR1, and
K = (K1,M21).
For the first term in (47), we have
1
n
H(Un|Zn, T n) =
1
n
[H(Un|T n)− I(Zn;Un|T n)
= RU − I(Z;U |T ) (48)
For the fourth term, similar to [10, Lemma 22.3], we can
bound it in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. If RK1 < H(U |Z, T )−H(U |Y, T )− 2δ(ǫ)
lim
n→inf
sup
1
n
H(Un|K1,M21, Z
n,M1, T
n)
≤ RU −RK1 −R21 −R1 − I(Z;U |T ) + δ(ǫ)
(49)
From the above derivation, we have
1
n
I(K;Zn,M1) =
1
n
[H(K)−H(K|Zn,M1)]
≤
1
n
H(K)− [RK1 +R21 +R22 − δ(ǫ)]
≤ δ(ǫ) (50)
which concludes the proof of the achievability.
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